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CONSUMER-DRIVEN LONG TERM CARE:
SHAPING THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
Marshall B. Kapp*
INTRODUCTION
In the traditional, historical American model of home and
community-based long-term care (HCBLTC) for individuals
with serious and ongoing impairments in the ability to perform
activities of daily living (ADLs), most of the important
operational facets (the who, what, where, when, and how) of
service financing and delivery have depended mainly on who is
paying the bill.' When the individual service recipient
personally pays for desired services, that person is respected as a
consumer and gets to negotiate the content of the service
delivery agenda, at least to the extent that there exists a
competitive marketplace of service providers vying for business
in the individual's locale. By contrast, when third-party payers
(ordinarily governmental entities) are involved, the HCBLTC
services received by the person with ADL impairments are
primarily driven by the policies and instructions of the agencies
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delivering or coordinating services, within well-delineated
programmatic constraints established by service funders.2
Consumers have limited choice and control about their own
long-term care (LTC) once enrollment in the public financing
program has commenced.
The traditional agency or funder-driven HCBLTC paradigm
emphasizes professionally-ascertained client needs and the
paramount goal of client safety. In addition, it seeks to
accomplish its primary objectives of quality control and
consumer protection through the application of direct
command-and-control regulation (i.e., regulatory "Thou shalts"
and "Thou shalt nots") of service providers' conduct.3  This
regulation is done, for example, via professional and
organizational licensing by the states, and federal or state
structural conditions yoked to providers' participation in
specific public funding programs such as Medicaid.4 Additional
legal tools relied on in this regard are the threat of civil and
criminal liability for violation of quality standards and the
endangerment of client safety.' The policy assumption
underlying the traditional model is that the behavior of service
providers needs to be pushed constantly in the direction of client
protection. Creating anxiety among providers about potential
personally adverse legal consequences for jeopardizing client
safety is likely the most effective way to achieve that behavioral
objective. Put differently, the envisioned ideal role of the law is
to prevent, detect, and punish provider malfeasance. 6  An
appropriate descriptive image is one of the law as a shield,
placing a protective barrier between the older consumer and
2. See Lori Simon-Rusinowitz & Brian F. Hofland, Adopting a Disability
Approach to Home Care Services for Older Adults, 33 GERONTOLOGIST 159, 160-61
(1993).
3. See KAPP, supra note 1, at 69-82 (2003) (discussing the legal climate in long
term care).
4. Marshall B. Kapp, Home Health Care Regulation: Is it Good for the Patient?, 1
CARE MGMT. J.: J. LONG TERM HOME HEALTH CARE 251-257 (1999).
5 Id. at 251.
6. Robert L. Kane, Changing the Face of Long-Term Care, 17(4) J. AGING & Soc.
POL'Y at 1, 13-14 (2005).
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those who would engage in mistreatment.
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HCBLTC: BACKGROUND
As already noted, the idea of consumer-driven LTC is nothing
novel as applied to individuals who have the financial means-
through personal pensions, invested savings, or private long-
term care insurance policies7 -to pay for services themselves.
The power of the purse is the power to negotiate, at least insofar
as choices of service providers are available within a particular
community. Similarly, a rich tradition of consumer-driven LTC
has developed over the past several decades in the context of
publicly funded LTC services for younger seriously disabled
persons who desire to define and control the parameters of their
service plans.8
However, over the past decade there has been a broad
conceptual and practical shift, even for the substantial
proportion of the older American population that depends on
public dollars to finance their HCBLTC.9 This shift, which
represents a logical expansion of the informed choice doctrine
beyond its original application to clinical medicine 0 and the
more recent consumer-driven health care contexts," has been
toward consumer-driven LTC delivery models within which the
7. See Joan Quinn et al., Long-Term Care Insurance: Care Management Practice
Issues, 5 CARE MGMT. J.: J. CASE MGMT., Spring 2004, at 25, 27-28.
8. See generally Simon-Rusinowitz, supra note 2 (discussing greater autonomy
of personal assistance choices in younger disabled persons compared to older
persons); Nancy N. Eustis, Consumer-Directed Long-Term Care Services: Evolving
Perspectives and Alliances, 24 GENERATIONS, Fall 2000, at 10-12.
9. See MARY JO GIBSON ET AL., AARP PUB. POL'Y INST, ACROSS THE STATES:
PROFILES OF LONG-TERM CARE (6th ed. 2004) (discussing the percentage of persons
in each state utilizing public funds for HCBLTC); see also Richard L. Kaplan,
Cracking the Conundrum: Toward a Rational Financing of Long-Term Care, U. ILL. L.
REV. 47, 57-73 (2004) (discussing the extent of coverage for long-term care provided
by the two government programs older Americans rely upon for HCBLTC,
Medicare and Medicaid).
10. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 53-101 (1986).
11. Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-Driven Health
Care: Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 19-24
(2006).
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older consumer is empowered to control the structural and
operational components of the service plan.12 This shift in the
gerontological sphere has been fueled by a variety of social,
economic, political, and legal factors.'3
Publicly financed consumer-driven HCBLTC models vary
significantly across the states in structure and operation.14 These
models are funded through a combination of federally approved
state Medicaid waivers authorized by 42 United States Code
1396n(c),15 dedicated state appropriations,16 and (at least for the
time being) private foundation demonstration project grants."
The precise methods of transmitting compensation to LTC
providers (e.g., via vendor payments made directly by the
governmental or private insurer versus entrusting clients with
vouchers or cash to spend themselves, with professional
counseling") vary from program to program. Contemporary
experimentation with consumer-driven models of LTC is by no
means limited to the United States,'" and several countries have
12. Robyn I. Stone, Consumer Direction in Long-Term Care, 24 GENERATIONS, Fall
2000, at 5; see also Barbara W. Schneider, et al., Consumer-Directed Care, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ELDER CARE 152-154 (M.D. Mezey ed., 2004).
13. See generally CONSUMER VOICE AND CHOICE IN LONG-TERM CARE (Suzanne
R. Kunkel & Valerie Wellin eds., 2006) (discussing new customer satisfaction
models for long-term care).
14. DONNA LIND INFELD, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE UNITS ON AGING & NAT'L
COUNCIL ON THE AGING, STATES' EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING CONSUMER-
DIRECTED HOME & COMMUNITY SERVICES: RESULTS OF THE 2004 SURVEY OF STATE
ADMINISTRATORS, OPINION SURVEY & TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS 6-10 (2004),
http://www.nasua.org/pdf/20026_text.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
15. Nancy A. Miller et al., Strengthening Home and Community-Based Care
Through Waivers, 18 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 1, 2-4 (2006); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
LONG-TERM CARE: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF GROWING MEDICAID HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVERS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 03-576 at 5-10 (2003).
16. LAURA L. SUMMER & EMILY S. IHARA, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, STATE-
FUNDED HOME & COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE PROGRAMS FOR OLDER PEOPLE 1-4
(2004), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/post-import/2004-11_hcbs.pdf
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
17. See, e.g., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION, GRANT RESULTS TOPIC
SUMMARY: FORMAL LONG-TERM CARE 5 (discussing partners in care giving: the
dementia services program grant that provides funding for consumer driven
HCBLTC).
18. Kevin J. Mahoney & Kristin Simone, History of and Lessons from the Cash and
Counseling Demonstration and Evaluation, in CONSUMER VOICE AND CHOICE IN LONG-
TERM CARE 43, 43-56 (Suzanne R. Kunkel & Valerie Wellin eds., 2006).
19. Kee-Lee Chou, et al., A Proposal for a Voucher System for Long-Term Care in
2007] CONSUMER-DRIVEN LONG TERM CARE
demonstrated more than a decade's worth of substantial positive
experience with these models. 20
Under the consumer-driven LTC paradigm, quality control
and direct protection of consumers against provider malfeasance
remain legitimate, but now secondary, functions of the law. The
main function of the law under consumer-driven LTC is
affirmative. Specifically, the law is expected to enable,
empower, and facilitate the informed, capable, and voluntary
exercise of consumer autonomy or self-determination within a
competitive, affordable marketplace of good quality services and
goods. Here, the law should be envisioned as a sword with
which consumer rights-most notably, the right to informed
choice -can be carved out.
The parameters of the government's proper role within the
emerging consumer-driven HCBLTC paradigm are discussed
below. These parameters include both autonomy-enhancing
initiatives and the regulatory limits that arguably ought to be
imposed as a matter of client protection, even under a consumer-
driven model of HCBLTC.
NECESSARY REGULATORY OVERLAY
Several states have been operating consumer-directed HCBLTC
programs for more than twenty years.21 These state programs
include a significant number of older persons "without any
evidence of significant problems for older consumers." 22  The
Hong Kong, 17 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 85, 88-91, 95-97 (2005).
20. JANE TILLY, AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., CONSUMER-DIRECTED LONG-TERM
CARE: PARTICIPANTS' EXPERIENCES IN FIVE COUNTRIES, ISSUE BRIEF 36, 3-8 (1999),
http://www.aarp.org/research/housing-mobility/homecare/aresearch-import-196-
IB36.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
21. See generally BARBARA COLEMAN, ET AL., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, FORUM FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY LEADERSHIP, STATE LONG-TERM
CARE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS & POLICY DIRECTIONS 2003 UPDATE (July 2003),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/1tc/LTC2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 20,
2007) (discussing the planning and implementation of a number of states' HCBLTC
programs).
22. JUDITH E. HEUMANN, AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., CONSUMER-DIRECTED
PERSONAL CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S., ISSUE BRIEF 64, 1 (2003),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/ib64_cd.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
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available empirical evidence supports the workability of this
model.23  Nevertheless, private arrangements between
consumers and independent contractors for HCBLTC services
entail a panoply of risks for the consumer (as well as for in-home
LTC workers).24 In some circumstances, attempted consumer
direction will fail.2 Even, and perhaps especially, under a
robust consumer-driven LTC model, a certain amount of
governmental regulation is essential to protect consumers.
For instance, access to the courts must remain available to
consumers to enforce the terms of private contracts entered into
by those consumers with private LTC insurers and sellers of
LTC goods and services. Consumers will only be willing to
continue to negotiate and join in contracts to the extent they feel
confident that the bargained-for terms will be enforced legally if
they are not complied with voluntarily. Additionally, civil tort
remedies, in the form of monetary damages, must remain
available to particular consumers who are seriously injured
because of private provider deviation from acceptable standards
of care (i.e., negligence) or intentional misconduct such as client
physical or financial abuse.
REGULATING THE INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The consumer-driven model begins with an informed consumer.
This, in turn, requires that adequate, appropriate,
comprehensible information about the benefits, risks, and costs
of various alternative services and service providers be readily
available to consumers who expect to direct the details of their
23. LARRY POLIVKA & JENNIFER R. SALMON, FLORIDA POLICY EXCHANGE ON
AGING, CONSUMER-DIRECTED CARE: AN ETHICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR STATE POLICYMAKERS 10-20 (2001), http://www.fpeca.cas.usf.edu/chltc
/PDFFiles/CDCfinalreport62101.pdf. (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
24. NAT'L PRIVATE DUTY Ass'N, CONSUMER AND WORKER RISKS FROM THE USE
OF NURSE REGISTRIES AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR COMPANIES 2-4 (Sept. 15,
2003), http://www.premierhomecare.org/images/privatehomecare.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007).
25. Marshall B. Kapp, When Consumer Direction Fails: Assigning Legal and Ethical
Responsibility in Worst-Case Situations, in CONSUMER VOICE AND CHOICE IN LONG-
TERM CARE 251, 251-260 (Suzanne R. Kunkel & Valerie Wellin eds., 2006).
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own HCBLTC. Ideally, consumers should be educated, trained,
and supported by objective professional sources to exercise their
choices in the manner that best accomplishes a particular
consumer's personal goals and preferences. 26 Legal initiatives
can positively influence the informational environment in
several ways.
Government mandates the collection and public
dissemination of a slew of comparative data concerning the
quality of services rendered by particular LTC providers. 27
Further research is needed to clarify how consumers actually use
this information to select providers and monitor their
performance. The Federal Trade Commission (relying on
statutory authority stemming from Congress' constitutional
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce) and its state
counterparts (relying on the states' inherent police power to
protect and promote the general health, safety, and welfare of
the community) should promulgate rules criminalizing false and
misleading advertising or other misrepresentations by service
and product sellers. False, misleading commercial speech,
designed to sell a service or product rather than to inform
political debate, is not protected against governmental
prohibition under the free speech clause of the United States
Constitution's First Amendment.
Further, consumers who are defrauded by deceptive
practices must be able to seek monetary damages for their
injuries in individual civil tort claims brought in state courts.
Additionally, government has a valuable role to play in setting
standards for the sales practices of private LTC insurance
companies, including regulation regarding product advertising.
26. Courtney B. Davis et al., Person-Centered Planning Training for Consumer-
Directed Care for the Elderly and Disabled, 6 CARE MGMT. J.: J. CASE MGMT. 122, 124-
127 (2005); Robert L. Kane, et al., Who Recommends Long-Term Care Matters, 46
GERONTOLOGIST 474, 474-75 (2006).
27. Vincent Mor, Improving the Quality of Long-Term Care with Better Information,
83 MILBANK Q. 333, 336-37 (2005).
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REGULATING TO ASSURE AN AUTONOMOUS CONSUMER
Actual consumer preferences lie at the heart of the consumer-
driven LTC paradigm. Those consumer preferences trump
policy makers' and LTC practitioners' externally generated and
imposed ideas about what consumers should desire.
Under the traditional agency or funder-driven LTC model,
consumers were forced to make a tradeoff.28 They forfeited
choice regarding most of the details of their own LTC in
exchange for the protection against the risk of harm purportedly
provided by an extensive web of command-and-control
regulation and tort and criminal liability potential surrounding
service delivery.29 It must be noted that the assumption about
the prophylactic consequence of legal regulation underlying the
traditional LTC model has not yet been subjected to rigorous
empirical analysis; it persists as an article of faith among
adherents of the regulatory approach.30
The consumer-driven LTC paradigm, by contrast, de-
emphasizes the safety preservation function of legal intervention
and, instead, more strongly emphasizes its autonomy
enhancement potential. An important policy-relevant
assumption, therefore, is that this tradeoff of assumed safety for
tangible control over LTC details is acceptable, if not
affirmatively desirable, to the majority of potential LTC
consumers and/or their families or other surrogates. 31
There is a corollary to this assumption about a tolerance, if
not a positive preference, for increased autonomy even at the
cost of some increased exposure to risk of harm (put differently,
a preference for quality of life over quality of care): namely, the
supposition that the great majority of consumers and/or their
28. See generally KAPP, supra note 1, at 91-120, (2003) (discussing the shift of
long-term care towards consumer choice).
29. Id. at 91-97, 101-103.
30. see NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABLITY, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH CARE:
How WELL DOES IT WORK? (2004) http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/
2004/pdf/consumerdirected.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
31. Kapp, supra note 25, at 251-60.
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surrogates are capable of intelligently making such tradeoffs of
some degree of increased exposure to risk of harm in order to
obtain and maintain desired forms of LTC from desired
providers under desired conditions.3 2 One (but only one) way
that such capability might be measured would be by comparing
the consistency of consumer choices with the intent of program
planners.33 Consumer self-determination could be exercised
either independently, in collaboration with family, friends, or
significant others, or by informally (i.e., without the involvement
of formal legal sanction) delegating decision making authority to
another individual(s) selected and trusted by the consumer.
It makes little sense to devise a LTC model predicated on
assumed consumer preferences unless we also assume most
consumers are able to act autonomously, by making important
decisions voluntarily, competently, and as an outcome of
rational manipulation of sufficient information, and that persons
lacking this capacity represent an exceptional category within
the much larger relevant population. Moreover, LTC by
definition involves the use of a frequently changing array of
services over an extended period of time; hence, proponents of
consumer-driven LTC must assume most consumers' adequate
capacity to function as autonomous decision makers exists not
just at the outset of LTC but on a continuing, ongoing basis as
well.
Nevertheless, even the most vigorous proponents of
consumer-driven LTC acknowledge that there will be some
(albeit a relatively small) percentage of older disabled HCBLTC
candidates who lack, temporarily or permanently, sufficient
cognitive and/or emotional capacity to act as autonomous
consumers despite any amount of informational and social
support.34 States could fulfill their parens patriae obligation to
32. See Kapp, supra note 25, at 98-101 (discussing consumers' ability to make
decisions regarding their care).
33. Hongdao Meng et al., Effect of a Consumer-Directed Voucher and a Disease-
Management-Health-Promotion Nurse Intervention on Home Care Use, 45
GERONTOLOGIST 167, 167-176 (2005).
34. Marshall B. Kapp, Consumer Choice in Home and Community-Based Long-Term
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protect these individuals by enacting legislation requiring
(except in those situations where the candidate has previously
been adjudicated incompetent by a court as part of a
guardianship or conservatorship proceeding) HCBLTC
candidates be evaluated to determine if they currently possess
sufficient decisional capacity to participate in a consumer-driven
service model.
Regarding those who are determined to lack adequate
present decisional capacity, advocates of consumer-driven LTC
suppose that there exist suitable mechanisms for surrogate
decision making about LTC (including HCBLTC options)." This
assumption contains two general components. First, it is
assumed that legal advance planning mechanisms, primarily
proxy directives (i.e., durable powers of attorney) supplemented
by instruction directives (i.e., living will-like instruments),
concerning LTC decision making either exist or can be created to
assist almost all decisionally incapacitated LTC candidates to
have their previously indicated LTC preferences followed.
Further, it is assumed that these legal devices will be created in a
timely fashion (i.e., while the consumer is still decisionally
capable) by most individuals who will become decisionally
incapacitated at some point in the future. Moreover, there is
faith that reliance on these advance planning documents in real
circumstances requiring specific decisions will achieve the
results, in terms of the shape of the LTC service plan, the
consumer had intended to achieve.
To assist in the fulfillment of this set of assumptions, the
states should amend their respective advance directive statutes
to expressly authorize the execution of both proxy and
instruction directions specially referring to planning for
HCBLTC (and, for that matter, for future nursing home care36 ).
Moreover, federal or state statutes could be enacted, analogous
Care: Policy Implications for Decisionally Incapacitated Consumers, 19(4) HOME HEALTH
CARE SERVICES Q., 2001, at 17, 23-24 (2001).
35. See Kapp, supra note 25, at 107-108 (discussing surrogates).
36. See Marshall B. Kapp, 'A Place Like That': Advance Directives and Nursing
Home Admissions, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 805, 815-817 (1998).
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to the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990,17 that compel
hospital discharge planners, physicians, and designated others
to inquire of a patient or the patient's surrogate, at designated
points in time (such as when the hospital discharge planning
process commences), whether the patient had previously
executed an advance LTC directive.38 When, as usually would
be the case, no advance LTC directive had been previously
executed, the law could require the discharge planner,
physician, or other professional to offer to assist the patient to
execute such a document. To aid in the enforcement of these
LTC directives, state LTC directive statutes could contain
provisions mandating that discharge planners, area agencies on
aging, and other participants who would be involved in the
individual's HCBLTC respect and implement the instructions
contained in a directive (subject to resource constraints and
exceptions based on potential ethically unacceptable risks of
harm to the vulnerable individual). Even under such
exceptional circumstances, the involved professionals should be
prohibited from interfering with a transfer of the consumer to
other providers who are willing and able to honor the
consumer's LTC advance directive.
There also is the belief on the part of consumer-driven LTC
advocates that willing and able individuals can easily be
identified and convinced to step in to make choices on behalf of
decisionally incapacitated LTC clients.39  Additionally, it is
assumed that an acceptable mechanism for holding these
surrogates accountable for acting consistently with the
consumer's wishes or, alternatively, in the consumer's best
interests, can be created. A suitable process of accountability in
this context would depend on several factors. These factors
include, among others: the prospective achievement of sufficient
consensus among interested stakeholders regarding appropriate
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(1) & 1396a(a) (Westlaw current through March 15,
2007).
38. 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(2) (Westlaw current through March 8 2007).
39. See generally KAPP, supra note 1, at 100, 107-08 (2003).
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minimum and optimal qualifications for LTC decision making
surrogates; agreement on the extent and limits of surrogates'
decision making powers; development of efficient and effective
ways of monitoring surrogates' performance as fiduciaries for
decisionally incapacitated LTC clients; and implementation of
aggressive but not overly intrusive strategies for intervening
when the surrogacy system goes seriously awry.
The various states' adult protective services (APS) statutes
could be amended to specifically address these factors in ways
that facilitate the efficacy of surrogate decision making for
matters pertaining to HCBLTC. These modifications to the
present APS system could be made as an exercise of each state's
inherent parens patriae authority to protect from harm those
persons who are de facto unable to protect themselves and hence
vulnerable to ethically and socially unacceptable risks.
REGULATING TO ASSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVES
Consumer choice, to be engaged in as a matter of private
negotiation and agreement, is only meaningful as more than a
slogan when consumers actually enjoy the opportunity to pick
from and negotiate specific details with an array of potential
local providers of LTC services and goods. To promote the
welfare, and thus encourage the participation, of independent
LTC service providers whose availability and willingness to sell
their services is integral to the maintenance of a vibrant
marketplace, government should attend to a variety of human
resource matters.40  These matters include application to
independent providers of the wage and hour provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act,41 workers' compensation and
unemployment insurance provisions, 42 the Social Security
40. See Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability Issues Affecting Consumer-
Directed Personal Assistance Services, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 251-60 (1996); see also Marshall
B. Kapp, Health Care in the Marketplace: Implications for Decisionally Impaired
Consumers and Their Surrogates and Advocates, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 21 (1999).
41. Sabatino & Litvak, supra note 40, at 274-85.
42. Id. at 288-91.
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retirement system, 43 and disability programs." To the extent the
legal environment and other factors can promote the job
satisfaction, safety,45 and general well-being of independently-
employed workers, those factors will contribute to the ultimate
success of the consumer-driven LTC model.46
Another central aspect of the legal environment concerns
providers' exposure to litigation and liability risks. Proponents
of consumer-driven LTC assume (without significant dispute
from most advocates of the more traditional, professionally
dominated service delivery model) that the prevailing legal
environment (both actual and perceived) can exert a powerful
effect on the behavior of people trying to avoid or minimize
their own exposure to negative legal consequences.4 7  Such
defensive risk management behavior, whether or not it actually
successfully reduces the actor's legal risk, may act either
beneficially or anti-therapeutically on the lives of the intended
beneficiaries (in this case, HCBLTC consumers) of the anxiety-
producing legal environment.
In the LTC context, it is assumed that the actual or
perceived climate relating to providers' legal risk exposure may
affect the availability, quality, and price of HCBLTC services in
any specific locality. 48  More specifically, proponents of
consumer-driven HCBLTC assume that a legal environment that
concentrates more (and is perceived as concentrating more) on
enhancing consumer autonomy and less on constantly policing
43. Id. at 267-70.
44. Id. at 292-93.
45. See generally Teresa Scherzer, et al., Integrating Occupational Health and Safety
into the United States' Personal Assistance Services Workforce Research Agenda, in
CONSUMER VOICE AND CHOICE IN LONG-TERM CARE 89,89-99 (Suzanne R. Kunkel &
Valerie Wellin eds., 2006) (discussing occupational health and safety for personal
assistance services workers).
46. See generally A.E. Benjamin & Ruth E. Matthias, Work-Life Differences and
Outcomes for Agency and Consumer-Directed Home-Care Workers, 44 GERONTOLOGIST
479, 479 (2004) (discussing work-life of consumer home-care workers); see also Stacy
Dale et al., How Do Hired Workers Fare Under Consumer-Directed Personal Care?, 45
GERONTOLOGIST 583, 583 (2005) (discussing the experience of workers hired under
consumer-directed care).
47. Kapp, supra note 25, at 109.
48. See KAPP, supra note 1, at 70-73.
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for provider malfeasance is likely to result in more providers of
services and goods vying for economically empowered
consumers' business in a competitive marketplace. This would
happen by reducing providers' apprehension about potential
regulators' aura of distrust and propensity to punish. That
development, in turn, is likely to enhance the accessibility,
affordability, and quality of LTC that consumers are able to
purchase. That is because these are all attributes every provider
wants to excel at in order to improve its own competitive
position in the business world of empowered, informed
purchasers.
The variety of LTC delivery models and legal climates
occurring as a result of differing political forces in different
jurisdictions will present natural opportunities for observational
studies. These studies can focus on determining the cause and
effect relationship between actual and perceived legal
environments, on the one hand, and the accessibility,
affordability, and quality of HCBLTC goods and services, on the
other. These natural experiments can be supplemented by the
analysis of evidence derived from specially designed
demonstration projects initiated in selected willing jurisdictions.
Conclusions drawn from the data produced by such natural and
interventional studies should then be used to inform the
regulatory development process, so that regulation in this arena
becomes more empirically based rather than reliant on untested
assumptions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MODEL
The starting factual precept of consumer-driven LTC is that at
least a significant proportion of disabled adults, including older
persons-even many of those with quite substantial ADL
impairments -strongly want to manage all or many of the
details of their own LTC rather than leave the most significant
service delivery details to a professional agency or funding
entity. This presumption is consistent with the contemporary
212 [Vol. 8
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American cultural commitment to the ethical and legal value of
autonomy. This belief in the desire for individual autonomy is a
fundamental article of faith49 nearly universally held among
members of the LTC policy community, rising virtually to the
level of a mantra.
Nonetheless, we know that there is some amount of
heterogeneity on this matter among various components of the
relevant population. 0  Individuals, deciding personally or
through a surrogate, who want to receive HCBLTC services
within a traditional regulatory model should be allowed and
enabled to do so. It would ironically defeat the goals of the
autonomy principle to force consumers to drive their own
HCBLTC plans unwillingly. A scaled down version of the status
quo ante needs to remain in place for those individuals, or
alternatively a default mechanism in the same way that in the
health care financing arena traditional Medicare Parts A and B
remain in place to be chosen by beneficiaries who do not wish to
join with the more than seven million individuals51 currently
participating in the more autonomy-oriented Medicare
Advantage-Part C option.
CONCLUSION
The paradigm shift to a consumer-driven model for the funding
and delivery of home and community based long-term care for
older, disabled individuals does not merely entail the removal of
a preexisting regulatory regime in which the most important
facets of the care plan were determined mainly by professionals
and bureaucracies instead of the consumer. Rather, this shift
49. See GEORGE J. AGICH, AUTONOMY AND LONG-TERM CARE 7-12 (1993).
50. See Mark Sciegaj et al., Consumer-Directed Community Care: Race/Ethnicity and
Individual Differences in Preferences for Control, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 489, 489 (2004)
(finding that "consumer direction occurs along a continuum ... and the importance
of recognizing heterogeneity within racial/ethnic groups regarding consumer-
directed care.").
51. Jane Zhang & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Seniors Flock to Private Medicare Plans;
Flexible Fee-for Service Policies Spur Growth in Alternatives to Government-Run
Coverage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at Dl.
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calls for a new and different approach to regulation. This article
has attempted to outline the necessary parameters of this new
regulatory approach to HCBLTC. The specific form and
contents of regulation in the era of consumer-driven HCBLTC
will depend in significant measure on a rethinking of the role of
government in the weighing and balancing of sometimes
competing social values implicating both the enhancement of
autonomy and protection of the vulnerable.
